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Background 
 Electricity is a complex, idiosyncratic and volatile commodity. 
 
- Non-storable: supply must meet demand at every instant. Ubiquitous: any aspect that 
affect the interconnection affects all players. 
 
 Forward/Future markets provide certainty for consumption and investments but 
regular forward pricing models are troublesome when applied to electricity. 
 
- Electricity non-storability implies that usual commodity pricing literature (and 
arbitrage/ cost of carry arguments) do not hold. 
 
 Electricity markets frequently present additional complications.  
- Oligopoly, auctions and vertical integration. 
 
 NZEM: The Wolak Controversial Report. 
 
- Wolak papers assume hedging as exogenous. In this thesis we address the 
determinants of hedging and its relationship with market power. 
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Thesis Outline 
Why hedging? 
 
 In a frictionless world with complete markets, hedge would not add value to firms. 
 
 Hedge as a response to corporate frictions (tax rules, transaction costs of bankruptcy 
and agency costs). Stulz (1990), Bessembinder (1991) and Froot, Scharfstein, and 
Stein (1993). 
 
 Hedge as a reaction to market friction (illiquidity). Mello and Parsons (2000) and 
Boyle and Guthrie (2006). 
 
 Electricity markets present an additional problem: incompleteness. Preferences/risk 
aversion matter and also work as proxies for frictions. In this case, market structure 
should be expected to be relevant as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
Context 
 
 Most of the literature takes forward contracts and forward prices as given when 
analysing their impact on market power. Allaz and Villa (1993), Newbery (1998), 
Green (1999), Ferreira (2003), Mahenc and Salanie (2004), Liski and Montero 
(2006), Green and Le Coq (2006) and Bushnell (2007). 
 
 Few paper endogenize forward contracts in an economic set-up but assume 
competitive markets. Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and Porchet et al. (2009). 
 
 This chapter combines these issues in a realistic electricity market set-up. It 
examines the question of how forward contract is determined and how its choice is 
affected by market power. Numerical simulations are conducted using NZEM data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic Model 
 Timing framework: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Problem is solved recursively. 
 
 Taking into account preferences and uncertainty about demand at t=2, Generators 
chose optimal supply schedule given revealed state variables and quantity contracted 
(t=1) . Spot market is cleared and clearing spot prices are determined.  
 
 Generators and retailers take into account uncertainty about state variables and 
demand disturbances and choose optimal hedging given optimal supply (t=0). 
Forward market is cleared and clearing forward prices are determined. 
 
First step: optimal schedule decision 
 
 Generator/Gentailer i’s maximization problem: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If we assume that supply strategy is additively separable, 
we are able to considerably simplify the problem. 
 
 Generators/Gentailers behave like monopolists with 
respect to the residual net demand. 
 
 
 
 
  …but we have multiple equilibria. 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal supply schedule 
elasticity of net residual demand 
 If we further assume that i) supply strategies are linear, ii) K>2 and iii) 
marginal costs and demand can be approximated by linear functions. 
 
 We able to derive optimal supply schedules:    
 
 Clearing the spot market, we derive a linear equilibrium relationship 
between spot prices and state variables/ quantities contracted given by 
market parameters: 
 
 This is a particular equilibrium (not unique) consistent with usual linearity 
approximations that make the hedging analysis tractable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Equilibrium spot market outcomes 
 Due to the incompleteness of electricity markets, we assume a utility 
maximization framework. In fact, we assume that managers’ utility can be 
approximated by a mean-variance function:  
 
 
 
 
 Firstly, assume symmetric and vertically separated generators… 
 
Second step: optimal hedging decision 
Market Power 
 Forward market clearing condition: 
 
 
 
 
 In equilibrium, the incentive to exercise market power is ultimately driven by risk 
aversion and risk exposure. 
Numerical Exercise 
 
Simplifications: 
 
 Vertical Separation (relaxed later). 
 
 Symmetry. 
 
 Generators and retailers have same risk aversion. 
 
 Two state variables (cost and demand shifters) that follows a multivariate 
normal distribution. 
 
 
 
Data 
 
 State variables: demand (national daily average offtake in GWh) and daily 
average hydro inflows (m3). Source: Electricity Commission website. 
 
 Haywards spot price series (NZD/MWh). Source: Electricity Commission 
website. 
 
 Haywards (month ahead) forward contracts (to build forward premium). 
Source: EnergyHedge company website (last accessed in 01/2011). 
 
 monthly series from 04/2004 to 06/2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calibrated parameters 
Forward Premium 
Hedge Ratio 
Market Power 
Vertical Integration 
What changes under VI assumption 
 
 Close substitute for forward contracts. 
 
 As far as we have large net retailers and net wholesalers, forward markets 
can coexist with high level of vertical integration. 
 
 However, in this case, the size of the forward market seems to be less 
sensitive to risk.  
 
 We should extend the model to endogenize VI and have an integrated view 
of hedging. 
 
 This substitution between forward hedging and vertical integration means… 
Market Power under VI 
Conclusion 
 
 
 Supply and hedging decisions are intrinsic to the market. 
 
 In equilibrium, the incentive to exercise market power is ultimately driven by 
risk aversion and risk exposure. Market power measurements should be 
controlled for risk. 
 
 outcomes of spot and forward markets can be differently affected by supply-
side and demand-side volatilities. 
 
 Vertical integration is also a hedge instrument (price and quantity risks) and 
should be analyzed as an intrinsic component of the market as well. 
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Some definitions 
 There are N firms (K generators and R retailers). Firms can participate in 
both markets (I=K+R-N gentailers). 
 
 State variables: 
 
 The consumers’ demand:             
 
 Generator i’s cost function:                         
 
 Contracts: 
 
 Retail market share:              
 
 
 
 
Equilibrium forward market outcomes 
Numerical Exercises 
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